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CANADIAN COMMERCIAL LAW*
ALBERT S. ABEL**
T HE existence in Canada of, first, a federal structure and, second, the two
major legal systems of the Western worldi--the civil law in Quebec, the com-
mon law in the other provinces-does not permit as tidy a summary of Canadian
law respecting commercial transactions and relations as can be made in coun-
tries lacking one or both of those features. There is division of legislative au-
thority over relevant particulars between levels of government and there is
diversity between common law and civil law concepts. Hence there is no com-
mercial law of Canada properly speaking, only commercial law in Canada-an
amalgam.
The confining construction which the courts have fixed on the grant to the
Dominion Parliament, by section 91 of the British North America Act,' of the
regulatory power over "trade and commerce ' 2 deprives it of any real significance
in this context. However, that section confers a long list of specific powers, sev-
eral of which relate to commercial subjects. Probably the most important are
those relating to "banking" and "savings banks," "bills of exchange and promis-
sory notes," "interest" and "bankruptcy and insolvency"-briefly, the essential
exchange and commercial credit arrangements of the Canadian economy. A
major share in formulating the law of carriage also accrues to the federal gov-
ernment from section 91(10), "navigation and shipping," and from sections
91(29) and 92(10) which, taken together, establish its authority over inter-
provincial "steam or other ships, railways, canals (and) telegraphs . . . ," thus
dividing the law on carriers into two parts-the intraprovincial, which remains
a matter of provincial competence, and all other, assigned to the federal Par-
liament.
Other comparably important subjects traditionally subsumed under the law
merchant-e.g., sale of goods, chattel or personal security-are nowhere ex-
pressly enumerated in the BNA Act. It has been generally accepted without
challenge or analysis that all of these are provincial matters, evidently compre-
hended within section 92 (13), "property and civil rights in the province."
Insofar as rights flowing from business transactions rest mediately or im-
mediately on a statute, the invoked statute must be intra vires the enacting
legislature. The law governing credit and exchange institutions and extrapro-
vincial carriage is set forth in the relevant federal statutes and is the same for
all Canada, save for any local variations prescribed in those statutes. Parlia-
mentary silence does not leave it open to the provincial legislatures to speak on
* This paper does not undertake to deal with the law of business organizations, ad-
dressing itself exclusively to that relating to commercial transactions.
** Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 31 (1867) [hereinafter cited BNAI.
2. For an excellent recent study of the field, see Smith, The Commerce Power in
Canada and The United States (1963).
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these matters of federal competence.3 Other branches of commercial law, being
for the provinces, may be molded by their several legislatures to suit local
notions and needs.
There is nevertheless substantial, although not complete, correspondence
among all provinces other than Quebec. On matters covered by statute-and in
Canada as in other advanced economies most major areas now are partly or
wholly so covered-there are strong family resemblances deriving from the
tendency to borrow legislative provisions from the common law heritage of
basic concepts, and sometimes from the recommendations of the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, whose activity has been
greatest with respect to mercantile law.4 Without a statute, the common law,
including equity and the law merchant, prevails. In principle this is the same
in all these provinces and conforms to the common law of England.5 In practice
that is not wholly true. There are occasional divergences between provinces in
the development of common law doctrine,0 indeed even in the application of
federal statutory provisions.7 But by and large it may be said that each province
receives as authoritative the law as expounded by the courts in another province
or in England. Thus, in broad outlines, commercial law doctrines, even in non-
federal areas, have a similar tenor with variations only in detail, usually at-
tributable to statute.
Quebec's situation is unique. Competent federal legislation of course applies
there as elsewhere, including the relevant common law when expressly incor-
porated by reference-an alien graft which has occasioned some awkwardness
in application.8 Its own provincial law derives from and reflects civil law sources.
The very idea of what "commercial law" is differs somewhat between the com-
mon law and the civil law systems. Both rest on the pervasive lex Inercatoria
of the Middle Ages. However, lex mercatoria, addressing itself to the transactions
distinctive of a special community, the merchants, could be regarded as focusing
either on the dealings or on the dealers. Common law thinking emphasized the
former, civil law the latter. While Quebec, departing from Napoleonic Code
practice, has no special Commercial Code, that being only in part replaced by
special provisions in book IV of the Civil Code, supplemented by incorporation
3. Cf. Att'y-Gen. of Ont. v. Winner, [1954) A.C. 541, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 657, 13 W.W.R.
(n.s.) 657.
4. See Uniformity of Legislation in Canada-An Outline And Rules of Drafting 21
(1949).
5. Cf. Loczka v. Ruthenian Farmers' Co-op., 32 Man. 137, 68 D.L.R. 535, [1922)
2 W.W.R. 782 (stressing desirability of uniformity in commercial matters).
6. Compare, e.g., Sawyer v. Pringle, 18 Ont. AR. 218 (1891), with Harris v. Cum-
mings, 3 Terr. L.R. 189 (1893). See Berlin Interior Hardware Co. v. Colonial Inv. & Loan
Co., 11 Sask. 46, 38 D.L.R. 643, [1918] 1 W.W.R. 378 (following English, in preference to
Ontario, decisions).
7. Compare Warner v. Simon-Kaye Syndicate, 27 N.S. 340 (1894) (Maker of note
never presented at specified place of payment is not liable under Bills of Exchange Act, Can.
Rev. Stat. c. 16, § 183 (1927) (hereinafter cited BEA).), with Canadian Bank of Commerce
v. Bellamy, 8 Sask. 381, 9 W.W.R. 587 (1915) (maker liable).
8. See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Amireault, 65 Que. K.B. 1 (1938); La Banque Na-
tionale v. Huot, 64 Que. C.S. 359 (1926).
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by reference0 of other Civil Code provisions, commercial law is conceived of as
a special body of principles concerned with the activities of business enterprises
("commerqants").1 ° There are other sections dispersed throughout the Code
making special provision as to traders.
What is meant by "commercial law" is pure semantics. The awkwardness
and incoherence of a discussion proceeding on two disparate bases forces a
choice of meaning. Adoption for purposes of this article of common law usage
(with its transactional, as opposed to personal, orientation of "commercial
law") rests purely on grounds of convenience-the assumed mental habits of
most prospective readers and the author's own common law training. For
Quebec, indeed for any civil lawyers, there may seem to be aberrations of both
inclusion and exclusion. Some justification may also be found in the fact that
discussion of each topic is introduced by an examination of federal law and that
of the common law provinces, with Quebec similarities and differences then
noted, an arrangement which lends itself to using the common law conception
as an organizing device.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
In a belated exercise of the British North America Act's grant of power
over "bills of exchange and promissory notes," Parliament in 1890 adopted
The Bills of Exchange Act" modeled upon the United Kingdom Act of 1882.
With minor changes and considerable internal rearrangement, the statute con-
tinues, substantially unaltered, to embody the law on bills, notes, and checks.
It is the comprehensive code now operating throughout the country uniformly,
although until recently there were provisions especially applicable to Quebec re-
quiring protest as a standard condition for perfecting rights against secondary
parties on the paper.' 2 Some provisions (e.g., those relating to bills in a set)' 3
have been rendered largely anomalous by improved and evolving commercial
practice. Crossed checks never had a place in Canadian banking practice and
that part of the statute' 4 has always been a dead letter. Certified checks, on the
other hand, are rather common but are not expressly mentioned in the Act, so
that a gloss, American in inspiration, has been required. 15 The Act could do
with an updating to eliminate such major anomalies and to correct the three
generations' accretion of constructional ambiguities and incongruities. But
familiarity seems to have bred content; there is not a whisper of demand for
9. Que. Civ. Code art. 2278 [Quebec Civil Code hereinafter cited QCC].
10. 1 P. Perrault, Traite De Droit Commerciale 12, 37 (1936); see 6 P. Mignault, Droit
Civil Canadien 65 (1902) ("On peut poser le principe general que les actes fait par un
commercant pour les besoins de son commerce sont commerdaux, malgre qu'ils seraient
civils s'ils etaient faits par un non-commercant."); Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Labonte,
[1947] Que. K.B. 415.
11. [1890] Can. Stat. c. 33.
12. BEA §§ 113, 114 (Protest of inland bills required for Quebec bills, is otherwise op-
tional.), as amended, [1966] Can. Stat. c. 12, § 3.
13. Id. §§ 158, 159.
14. Id. §§ 168-175.
15. See Abel, Crossed Cheques and Certified Cheques, 105 Sol. J. 877 (1961).
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reform; and it may safely be predicted that bills, notes, and checks will con-
tinue for the indefinite future to be governed by the present Act.
To third persons as putative transferees of obligations, the law of negotiable
paper owes its two distinctive features. One feature, which is fundamental, is
that the paper is capable of passing freely from hand to hand. Another, which
is usual, is that the paper accrues additional liabilities through successive trans-
fers.
Negotiability is only one type of transferability, but it is an immensely
useful type for it allows one to take under circumstances giving him the status
of a holder in due course, free of various personal defenses and equities available
against an assignee even bona fide.16 Dealings are expedited by dispensing with
time-consuming collateral inquiries. Hazards other than that of party solvency
are eliminated so that the terms of transfer approach a pure interest rate un-
complicated by entrepreneurial risk compensation. These economies, probably
essential for an efficient credit mechanism, presuppose a standard instrument
clear in its tenor.
A considerable part of the law about negotiable paper consists of specifying
the requisites of such an instrument-writing, certainty of time and of amount,
performance only by money payment, prescribed parties, unconditionality of
obligation-every one of which must be satisfied in order for the paper to be
negotiable.17 Otherwise it is at best an assignable contract. What is involved in
each case is the question of construing the terms of the particular instrument.
Naturally not all the decisions are readily reconcilable. A Canadian oddity is
the notion of lien notes, a characterization used by early judges, skittish about
the emerging and then still unfamiliar conditional sale transaction,' 8 to deny
negotiability to paper with clauses retaining title by way of security. The ex-
pression still makes an appearance in some judicial and academic discussions,
but the difficulty is now easily circumvented and has dwindled to at most a
trap for the unwary.19 Paper negotiable at inception continues negotiable until
it is discharged or endorsed restrictively, i.e., in a form incompatible with
further circulation. 20 Arrival of the due date may call for activity incident to
enforcement and precludes any fresh creation of holders in due course, but it
does not make an instrument non-negotiable.
16. See Chandler v. Portland Edmonton Cement Co., 10 Alta. 456, 33 D.L.R. 302,
(App. Div. 1917).
17. The key provisions are BEA §§ 17, 176, setting out the requisites of a bill and a
note respectively. Other statutory sections elaborate the meaning of the constituent elements.
18. The doctrine was first invoked in Dominion Bank v. Wiggins, 21 Ont. A.R. 275
(1894) which made no reference to the earlier contrary judgment in Harris v. Cummings,
3 Terr. L.R. 189 (1893).
19. Various techniques for escaping the lien note doctrine or for rendering it irrelevant
have been developed, the main alternatives being illustrated by (a) Int. Harvester Co. of
America v. Grant, 4 E.L.R. 1 (P.E.I. 1907); and (b) Edgar v. Bahrs, 11 Sask. 457, 43
D.L.R. 372 (1918); and (c) Killoran v. Monticello State Bank, 61 Can. S. Ct. 528, 57
D.L.R. 359 (1921). Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Johnson, 21 Alta. 504, 3 W.W.R. 328,
[1925] 4 DL.R. 511 seems to be the last case where a note was held not a promissory note
because a lien note.
20. BEA § 69.
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Only by his signature on negotiable paper does one become liable as a
party thereto.21 The notion of a written or oral acceptance exterior to the instru-
ment was not received into the Bills of Exchange Act, but a liability very
similar in its consequences, binding a drawee on contract or by estoppel, may
be recognized.22 A transferor's liability, akin to the implied condition of title
imposed on the seller of goods, also attends negotiation even without signature of
bearer paper.23
Liability as a party to the paper is of two fundamentally different kinds,
primary and secondary. In this connection, the instrument itself and a contract
which gave rise to it are to be distinguished. As to both, there may be primary
and secondary parties, but relative status as to the contract and the commercial
paper may differ. The quality of liability on the paper always depends entirely
on the status expressed by the signature, regardless of what the liability may
be on the underlying contract.24 Such problems ordinarily arise in connection
with accommodation parties. A stranger to the chain of title may become an
endorser, doing so normally by way of accommodation. Such a one is an aval,
a position recognized in the civil law. This doctrine is a distinctive Quebec
contribution to the Canadian law of negotiable instruments.25
Parties primarily liable on the instrument-makers and acceptors-under-
take without contingency to pay the instrument to the holder according to its
tenor. This is so fundamental that a majority of provinces hold that even the
designation of a place for payment does not make presentment there a condition
to enforcing a promissory note against the maker.2 6 Secondary parties--drawers
and endorsers-besides having a transferor's liability similar to but somewhat
more persistent than that which arises from delivery of bearer paper,27 contract
for a contingent liability; viz., to make good should the primary party default,
but only in the event that prescribed steps are taken or excused.2 8 The detail
of what steps need be taken and how and when they should be taken is highly
complex. The general idea is to assure initial resort to primary parties and to
give secondary parties a chance both to make arrangements for having requisite
funds on hand and to take steps looking to self-protection. To those ends,
presentment for payment and sometimes for acceptance, notice of dishonor, and
21. Id. § 132; Craig v. Matheson, 32 N.S. 452 (1900). For discussion of an allonge,
see Barney v. Lauzon, 17 Sask. 1, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 140, [1923] 2 W.W.R. 10.
22. Cf. Simpson v. Dolan, 16 Ont. L.R. 459 (1908); Bank of Montreal v. Thomas, 16
Ont. 503 (1888); Molson's Bank v. Seymour, 21 L.C. Jur. 782 (1877).
23. BEA § 138(b). Note that this is not a liability "on the instrument." Id. § 137(2).
24. See, e.g., Stewart v. Braun, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 423, [1925] 1 W.W.R. 871 (Man.);
Carrique v. Beaty, 24 Ont. A.R. 302 (1897).
25. Gallagher v. Murphy, [1929] 2 Can. S.Ct. 288, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 124; Robinson v.
Mann, 31 Can. S.Ct. 484, 22 C.L.T. 2 (1901).
26. J. Falconbridge, Banking & Bills of Exchange 916 (6th ed. 1956).
27. Transferor liability is "to his immediate transferee." BEA § 138. Endorser liability
is "to his immediate or a subsequent endorsee."Id. § 133(c).
28. Vanier v. Kent, 11 Que. K.B. 373 (1902). BEA § 133(a), announcing the general
principle, speaks of liability "if the requisite proceedings are duly taken" but numerous
specific provisions envisage their being "dispensed with." See id. §§ 92, 106, 107, 108, 110,
or "excused," see id. § 79.
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protest, in the case of foreign bills, are made conditions to secondary party lia-
bility. In practice, the significance of these requirements is much diminished by
the inclusion in standard bill or note forms of comprehensive waiver clauses.
To be effective each act called for must be timely done.29 However, demand
notes, endorsed to be held as collateral or continuing security, need not be pre-
sented for payment during the existence of such a holding.30
Secondary as well as primary parties may be liable to holders, even those not
holders in due course since holding in due course does not address itself to the
categories of parties against whom claims are assertable but rather to the in-
vulnerability of a claim against whomsoever made. A holder in due course is
one who has taken paper complete and regular on its face, in good faith, for
value, without notice and before maturity.31 Good faith, legislatively defined as
acting honestly, whether negligently or. not,3 2 and perhaps the most nebulous
of the elements, has been given substance by denial of holder in due course
protection to an endorsee otherwise qualified who participates intimately and
actively in the endorser's business operations which generate paper tainted by
fraud. 33 However, if this and all other requisites for a holding in due course are
satisfied, the holder is indeed a favorite of the law, even to the extent of escap-
ing, in special situations, the consequences of spuriousness of a prior signature
on the paper. Even he, of course, cannot recover against the person whose signa-
ture was forged, 4 but he is sometimes able to recover or defend against others as
though it were a genuine signature. Thus the doctrine of Price v. Neal3 r with its
ramifications is recognized 36 although neither statute nor case law clearly re-
solves the problem, left open by an early indecisive Ontario judgment,3 7 of
whether the preclusion applies to a bill payable to drawer where contemporane-
ously and before presentment to the drawee there is parallel forgery of drawer
and payee-first endorsee signatures. Doubt has been voiced as to whether the
rule in Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers,38 prevails in Canada. In that
case the issue about the forged endorsement was whether it was a needed
vehicle for the conveyance of rights or whether, instead, the paper was bearer
paper, negotiable with no endorsement and so with a forged endorsement; the
stated criterion was the drawer's intention respecting the payee-an inexact
statement since there the purported drawer knew nothing about the paper and
29. Dowler v. Edwards, 13 Alta. 250, 40 D.L.R. 180, [1918] 2 W.W.R. 345 (notice of
dishonor) ; Sparks v. Hamilton, 47 Ont. L.R. 55 (1920) (protest).
30. BEA § 181; Bank of Ottawa v. Christie, 37 Ont. L.R. 330, 37 Ont. L.R. 646 (1916).
31. Id. § 56.
32. Id. § 3.
33. Federal Discount Corp. v. St. Pierre, [1962] Ont. 310, 32 D.L.R.2d 86 (1962) ; Huot
v. Banque Canadienne Nationale, [1944] Que. K.B. 497.
34. BEA § 49(1).
35. 3 Burr. 1355, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
36. BEA § 129.
37. Ryan v. Bank of Montreal, 12 Ont. 39 (1886), appeal dismissed, 14 Ont. A.R. 533(1887).
38. [1891] A.C. 107.
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could have had no intention. The status of the rule in Canada is presently un-
clear.39
BAxnG: CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
The Bank of Canada, a federal Crown corporation, exercises typical central
banking functions and is the only bank of issue.40 It does not engage in com-
mercial banking nor does it serve as a bank of deposit for individuals or firms.41
These are the activities of the chartered banks,42 operating under the Bank Act,
a federal statute.43
The chartered banks are now ten in number. They have a tremendous
network of branches scattered through all the provinces and practically all
communities, with many branches of each chartered bank in each major urban
center. The broad proposition that each chartered bank, as an aggregate with all
of its branches, constitutes one legal entity may overstate their integration.
Certainly for special purposes, such as venue of causes44 and local taxation,45
the individual branch has received separate recognition, and transactions, such
as stop payment orders48 and notices of dishonor of negotiable paper,4 7 given to
one branch, are not regarded as instantaneously affecting all other branches.
The single entity concept was developed to identify the debtor status vis-a-vis
customers as being that of the entire aggregate not just that of the particular
branch dealt with, despite credit transfers internal to the system, 48 and may
perhaps exhaust its function in that context.
The basic relationship between bank and depositor is that of debtor and
creditor,49 the latter having no ownership in funds or items left on deposit but
only a contractual claim to the balance standing to his credit. The Bank Act
does not specify the incidents of the relation which are mostly left to be settled
by general provincial law, statutory or other, about creditors' claims. By the
language or nature of the transaction, banks may and do occasionally assume
instead the status of bailee, as for safety deposit vaults, or of agent, as in the
receipt of commercial paper not as holder but strictly for collection; then the
39. See Bank of Toronto v. Smith, [1950] Ont. 457, [1950] 3 D.L.R. 169; Harley v.
Bank of Toronto, [1938] Ont. 100, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 135.
40. See Bank of Montreal v. Bay Bus Terminal (North Bay), Ltd., [19631 1 Ont. 561,
38 D.L.R.2d 123.
41. The Bank of Canada Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 12, (1952); Dorrance, The Bank of
Canada in Banking in the British Commonwealth (R. Sayers ed. 1952).
42. For a broad survey of historical development and structure, see Curtis, Evolution
of Canadian Banking, 253 Annals 115 (1947).
43. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 12 (1952).
44. Bank of Toronto v. Pickering, 46 Ont. L.R. 289 (1919).
45. Rex v. Lovitt, [1912] A.C. 212.
46. Garrioch v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, [1919] 3 W.W.R. 185 (Alta.); Barre
v. Gauthier, [1949] Que. K.B. 665.
47. Bank of Montreal v. Dominion Bank, 60 D.L.R. 403 (Ont. 1921).
48. Bain v. Torrance, 1 Man. 32 (1884); White v. Royal Bank, 53 Ont. L.R. 543
[1923] 4 D.L.R. 1206.
49. Royal Trust Co. v. Molsons Bank, 27 Ont. L.R. 441, 8 D.L.R. 478 (1912).
11
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respective rights and liabilities are those appropriate to the special status rather
than those as between debtor and creditor.50
In the absence of special contract terms, the bank's undertaking is to pay
on demand, i.e., on receipt of a proper order, conventionally on presentation of a
check. This may be altered by contract, and language frequently appears on
deposit slips and in passbooks conditioning the bank's obligation upon such
things as presentation of the passbook, or notice for a certain time. In practice,
observance of the stated conditions is commonly not insisted upon. A bank
which pays to a third person not presenting a proper order, which generally
means one having a check but not qualifying as the holder, must restore to the
depositor's account amounts so disbursed and fall back on the claim, not always
very valuable, of restitution against the person from whom it took the order."'
A stop payment order clearly communicated is a countermand, disregard of
which involves a breach of the bank's undertaking,52 so that its attributes are
contractual and not delictual. 53
In the ordinary debtor-creditor situation, the bank is entitled to a lien on
specific items it receives from the customer in the course of ordinary banking
transactions for claims similarly arising against the customer. 4 There is further
a right of setoff of aggregate accounts inter se.05 This right of setoff is limited at
any given time to obligations presently due 0 and, as concerns the aggregation
of deposits, to those due in substance to the same depositor, for which purpose
distinct accounts, although held by different branches, may be consolidated."1
The general duty of care which pervades the common law applies to the
bank and to the depositor, each being answerable for any loss caused to the other
by negligence in the context of their special relationship. 8 There is no specific
duty on a depositor to make any verification of payments from or of the bal-
ance of the deposit and a failure to do so does not in itself constitute negligence. 0
50. As to safety deposits, see Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Mastracchio, [1962)
Can. S. Ct. 53, 30 D.L.R.2d 510 (1961); as to a bank as collecting agent, see Nelson v.
Union Bank, 33 Man. 508, [1923] 3 W.W.R. 1330; Perreault v. Merchants Bank, 27 Que.
C.S. 149 (1905).
51. Agricultural Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Bank, 6 Ont. A.R. 192 (1881). BEA
§ 49(3) conditions claims against a drawee bank for payment under forged endsorsements
upon the drawer's giving notice of the forgery within a year.
52. BEA § 167; cf. Kelly v. CPR, 22 B.C. 891, 25 D.L.R. 79, 9 W.W.R. 531 (1915).
53. Barnhardt v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, [1952] Que. C.S. 265.
54. Commercial Bank v. Page, 13 N.B. 326 (1870); Merchants Bank v. Thompson, 26
Ont. L.R. 183, 3 D.L.R. 577 (1912).
55. McCready Co. v. Alberta Clothing Co., 3 Alta. 67, 3 W.L.R. 680 (1910); Wallinder
v. Imperial Bank of Can., 36 B.C. 226, [19253 4 Dl..R. 390, [1925] 3 W.W.R. 409.
56. Cf. Royal Bank v. Slack, [1958] Ont. 262, 11 D.L.R.2d 737; Vanier v. Kent, 11
Que. K.B. 373 (1902) ("compensation").
57. Daniels v. Imperial Bank, 8 Alta. 26, 19 D.L.R. 166, 7 W.W.R. 666, 30 W.L.R.
133 (1914) (not as between personal account and trust account); Clarkson v. Alliston,
62 Ont. L.R. 149, [1928) 2 D.L.R. 715.
58. Will v. Bank of Montreal, [1931] 3 D.L.R. 526, [1931] 2 W.W.R. 364 (Alta.)(negligence of customer); Banque Nationale v. Payette, 29 Rev. Leg. (n.s.) 369, [1924]
1 D.L.R. 483 (1923) (negligence of bank).
59. Columbia Graphophone Co. v. Union Bank, 38 Ont. L.R. 326, 34 D.L.R. 743(1916).
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Initialing or signature of a bank statement establishes it as an account state-
ment, at least if applicable written terms expressly so provide; 60 but whether,
absent such a provision or particularly absent initialing or signature, failure to
contest the accuracy of a submitted statement operates thus is doubtful.
Joint bank accounts have engendered a baffling corpus of case law but the
perplexing questions arise mainly between depositors and are not properly a
commercial law concern. The bank's position is usually spelled out by contract
terms at the time the account is opened authorizing it to make payments upon
the signature of either joint depositor. These terms have proved quite effective
in protecting banks from embroilment.61
It will be apparent that the general structure of the common law resembles
English common law, which has indeed been much invoked as a source of gen-
eral propositions, perhaps beyond its true relevance in light of the institutional
differences; e.g., deposits and payments by check are commonplace to all sui
juris Canadians in contrast to Britain where bank use historically was significant
only to those managing businesses or fortunes and still operates in the shadow
of that tradition.6 2 Accommodation to the different setting has occurred in ap-
plication by preserving the old rubrics intact while flexibly interpreting those
circumstances which affect their operation; this may be sufficient, provided it
does not eventuate in a heedless emulation of particular results posited on a
different social and business situation.
The position of banks as creditors advancing funds, unlike their status as
debtors receiving deposits, is extensively dealt with in the Bank Act. The two
relations naturally may coexist and overlap, since many deposits are created by
banks' credit allocations, especially to firms, and many implicate reciprocally a
continuing flow of items received from trade customers by depositors and an
agreed line of credit. The overlap may also develop through overdraft financing,
until recently a characteristic technique but currently discouraged by the regu-
latory authorities. Yet the two statuses of banks are conceptually distinct, ad-
mitting of independent treatment and specification even though both elements
may need to be considerd in the resolution of a total situation.
The gist of the Bank Act provisions bars a bank from doing business as a
trader or dealer in property or commodities (other than money) 63 while
authorizing it to engage in a wide range of credit operations. 64 It may acquire
tangibles, other than its own business plant and equipment,65 only as an incident
60. Mackenzie v. Imperial Bank, [1938] Ont. W.N. 166, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 764.
61. Matter of Mailman, [1941] Can. St. Ct. 368, [1941] 3 D.L.R. 449.
62. Such a statement is necessarily based on impressions and difficult to document in
the absence of any direct statistical comparison. Clearly individual checking accounts are
increasingly used in the United Kingdom, but as far back as World War II, while in Canada
the number of such accounts equaled or perhaps somewhat exceeded the number of house-
holds, in the United Kingdom check issuance in the mid-1950s was only of the order of one
per month per capita, see B. Higgins, Canada's Financial System in the War, NBER 48-49
(1944); J. Holden, History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law 306, 307 (1955).
63. [1966-67] Can. Stat, c.87 § 75(2)(b).
64. Id. §§ 75(1)(b), (c), (d).
65. Id. § 84(1).
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to realizing on collateral and must dispose of them accordingly, with detailed
prescriptions for, and a time limitation on, the holding of real or immovable
property. 6 There are ceilings on loans on the credit of shareholders and bank
personnel. 67 There being no other restriction on the making of unsecured loans,
it is left to the discretion of the bank's agents to be exercised in the setting of
the law's reporting and inspection procedures and of the policies and anticipated
reactions of the responsible authorities.0 8
While virtually any kind of property other than it's or any bank's shares 3
may provide the underlying basis of security for a loan, as may promissory
commitments of secondary parties, the Act elaborates distinctions relating to
the character and evidences of the debtor's interest in the property which make
it eligible as collateral. The Act spells out at length what may be done in con-
nection with documents of title-warehouse receipts and bills of lading7 -and
with farmers' and fishermen's stocks and equipment.71 For these latter and for
other inventory loans,72 registration of a borrower's notice of intention within
three years preceding the giving of the security safeguards against intervening
adverse claims.73 This provision recognizes the validity of forward inventory
financing for many types of business while simultaneously conditioning such
validity.
If the security is permissible in type and mode of acquisition, the bank's
claim "shall have priority over all rights subsequently acquired in, on or in
respect of such property" and, with large qualifications, over unpaid vendors'
claims. 74 Such priority, being federally given, effectively supersedes any pro-
vincial rules about priorities.7 5 The provincial law which governs the attributes
of competing rights determines the time of their inception, however, so that
complex problems of interpretation can arise as to whether they were "acquired"
"subsequently" to the bank's security and must yield, or before it, in which
case they may claim their ordinary preference under applicable provincial law.70
In some cases, notably in credit extensions to the construction industry,
banks often take an assignment of book debts as security for a line of credit.
These arrangements have no special status under the Bank Act. Hence banks
are remitted to the general provincial law for the operative consequences and
66. Id. §§ 78, 80, 82, 84.
67. Id. §§ 75(2)(d), (e), (f).
68. Id. §§ 103-16, provides for preparation and submission to the Minister of Finance of
annual statements of liabilities and assets and of current operating earnings and expenses in
accordance with schedules to the Act. Id. § 64.65 establishes the Office of Inspector General of
Banks in the Department of Finance and outlines his duties and functions, including an
inspection at least once anually.
69. Id. § 75(2)(c).
70. Id. § 86, 87.
71. Id. § 88(1)(c)-(i).
72. See id. § 88(1)(a), (b).
73. See id. § 88(4)(a).
74. See id. § 89(1).
75. Tennant v. Union Bank, [1894] A.C. 31.
76. Cf. Matter of Newmarket Lumber Co., [1951] Ont. 642, [1951) 4 D.L.R. 720,
[1951] Ont. W.N. 649.
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priorities of the assignment as against for instance mechanics' or materialmen's
liens or non-federal tax claims. But while the assignment may not particularly
help the bank, it need not prejudice it. The bank may disregard both the assign-
ment and its own character as a bank and rely on any other capacity, such as
that of holder in due course, available under the circumstances.77
The chartered banks are not the only financial and credit institutions
operating in the country, even apart from government agencies devised at both
federal and provincial levels to assist with loans or guaranties for particular
persons or programs specially related to the achievement of some legislatively
favored public policy.78 "Banking" is exclusively a federal matter under section
91 of the British North America Act; and no institution may call itself a bank
nor engage in the full array of banking activities except a chartered bank.79
But operations, in substance similar to large segments of a bank's operations,
whether in extending loans, discounting paper, or receiving and investing funds
for repayment, are carried out by a multitude of other enterprises, typically
established under provincial authority. A very considerable part of consumer
and even of retailer financing is supplied by "finance" or "acceptance" com-
panies as discounters of chattel paper.80 Trust companies serve the real prop-
erty mortgage market.8 ' Loan corporations8 2 akin to England's building soci-
eties, and credit unions 3 pool funds, characteristically in terms of "member-
ship" rather than of "deposit," for various types of authorized investment,
some emphasis being given to making credit available to participants in the
pool. The "caisse populaire" in Quebec is an outstanding example of this.84
Insurance companies provide large blocks of credit for construction projects
and corporate financing. No adequate account of these institutions can be given
in brief compass; but mention of them is needed to dispel any inference of
identity between the banking system and credit institutions. As a very broad
generalization, it may be said that the non-bank components are creatures of
the provinces, governed in their dealings by the general law applicable to any
77. Compare John M. Troup, Ltd. v. Royal Bank, [1962] Can. S. Ct. 487, 34 D.L.R.2d
556, with Royal Bank v. Blick, 39 D.L.R.2d 36 (Man. 1963).
78. For a resume of federal activity in this connection, see 3 J. Glassco Report of the
Royal Commission on Government Organization 251-297 (1962). As samples of provincial
activity, see, e.g., The Consolidated Cheese Factories Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 63 (1960);
The Industrial Development Act, Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 245 (1952).
79. As to what constitutes "banking," see Att'y-Gen. of Can. v. Att'y-Gen. of Que.,[1947] 1 D.L.R. 81, [1947] A.C. 33, [1946] 3 W.W.R. 659 (P.C.); Matter of Bergethaler
Waisenamt, 57 Man. 66, [1949] 1 D.L.R. 769, [1949] 1 W.W.R. 323.
80. See Ziegel, The Legal Problems of Wholesale Financing of Durable Goods in
Canada, 41 Can. B. Rev. 54 (1963).
81. See, e.g., The Trust Companies Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 389 (1960); The Trust
Companies Act, N.B. Rev. Stat. c. 237 (1952); The Loan and Trust Corporations Act,
Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 222 (1960).
82. See, e.g., The Loan Companies Act, N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 157 (1954); The Loan and
Trust Corporations Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 222 (1960).
83. See, e.g., The Credit Unions Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 54 (1954); The Credit Union
Societies Act, P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 38 (1951).
84. The statutory basis for this flourishing institution is The Quebec Co-operative
Syndicate Act, Que. Rev. Stat. c. 290 (1941) ; cf. Caisse Populaire de St. Arsene v. Benoist,
[1953] Que. C.S. 274.
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individual or at least any other private company doing business in the province,
but with additional statutory limitations.8 5
The grant of authority over "interest" to the federal government has
meant that the subject has gone almost unregulated, Parliament having been
reluctant to do much about it and the provinces having been powerless. Aside
from a six per cent ceiling on bank loans 6 and a few narrowly defined pro-
visions applicable to particular lenders such as small loan companies,87 there
is no limit on what may be exacted, only an establishment of five per cent as
the legal rate where no other is expressly contracted for.88 The fantastic rates
to which some ignorant or improvident or distressed borrowers commit them-
selves are not, however, utterly beyond the reach of the provinces. Excluded
though the provinces obviously are from direct usury legislation, some pro-
vincial legislation has been written translating equity's historic hostility to op-
pressive and unconscionable transactions into specific prohibitions and, in this
context, such legislation has been sustained by the Supreme Court.80
SALE OF GOODS
The caption of this subtopic, while familiar enough to those versed in the
common law and while none better suggests itself, does not exactly fit the
Canadian experience due to the unique situation of Quebec. In Quebec one
deals not in "goods" but in "moveables" which are only approximately the
same,90 and "sale" under the Civil Code (whose provisions in general extend
indiscriminately to movables and immovables) may contemplate a bit more
precision both in the thing sold and in the price term than will satisfy the com-
mon law.91 But those differences are terminological. The transactions which
"sale of goods" connotes to a common law lawyer occur equally in Quebec,
where they would usually be thought of in the light of a sale of movables and
where indeed they would ordinarily not differ greatly in their consequences.
Thus the expression may conveniently, even though somewhat inaccurately, be
used to mean that group of transactions. So understood it may be said initially
that there is a large correspondence, but falling short of a complete identity,
between the corpus of rights and duties arising from such transactions in the
85. Cf. Roblin Rural Credits Soc. v. Newton, 36 Man. 117, [1927] 1 D.L.R. 105, [1926]
3 W.W.R. 569 (1926); Matter of Mutual Inv., Ltd., 56 Ont. L.R. 29, [1924] 4 D.L.R. 1070.
A lender incorporated by special Dominion Act must similarly operate within the limit of
its statutory grant. Industrial Loan & Finance Corp. v. Jackson, 43 Rev. Leg. (n.s.) 423
(1937).
86. The Bank Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 12, § 91 (1952).
87. See The Money-Lenders Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 181 (1952); The Small Loans Act,
Can. Rev. Stat. c. 251 (1952).
88. The Interest Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 156 (1952).
89. See Att'y-Gen. of Ont. v. Barfried Enterprises, Ltd., [1963] Can. S. Ct. 570, 42
D.L.R.2d 137. But cf. Longley v. Barbrick, 36 D.L.R.2d 672 (N.S. 1962) (exercise of inher-
ent equity power).
90. For the distinction between immoveables and moveables, see Que. Civ. Code, book
II, tit. 1 [hereinafter cited QCC].
91. Cf. 7 3. Mignault, Droit Civil Canadien 5 n.(d) (1906).
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common law and in the civil law systems. Unqualified general propositions may
be taken as applying to both; specific differences will be rather freely noted.
The matter is important for here we are in an area of provincial competence.92
Each common law province has a statute9 3 modeled very closely on the
English Sale of Goods Act-more closely than the relevant provisions of the
Civil Code are on those of its prototype, the Code Napoleon" Indeed the most
distinctive thing to be said of the Civil Code may be that there is just about
nothing to be said of it that would seem distinctive to one acquainted with the
English law. As in England, the Act reflects with few exceptions the pre-existing
case law which therefore remains a valid guide for statutory interpretation.9 5
Whether title has passed, what the rights of the parties are in one or the
other case, and how far the seller must answer for defects in the goods or in
his ownership are the central preoccupations of the law.
Title passes when the parties intend it to pass.9 6 The Act, following the
common law, in order to derive an intention left undisclosed, calls in presump-
tions which vary according to whether the subject of the sales agreement is or
is not (a) in a deliverable state, and/or (b) specific and ascertained. If it is
both, title is presumed to pass at the time of the contract; 97 if ascertained but
not yet in a deliverable state, title passes when the subject becomes so and
the buyer is notified; 98 if unascertained or future, at the time there is "appro-
priation" by either party matched with assent thereto by the other.99 Under
the Code, it is a question not of presumption but of legal rule. Where the goods
are specific, ascertained and deliverable, the prescribed effective time corresponds
to the common law presumption. 00 If the goods are unascertained, title passes
when the goods are "certain and determinate" and the buyer is notified to that
effect' 0 ' (note that "appropriation" and assent are not specified). Nothing is
said in the Code about the case in which goods are ascertained but not yet
deliverable, except where what is to be done is weighing, measuring or counting,
92. B. Laskin, Constitutional Law 431 (2 ed. 1960).
93. In each province the statute is entitled The Sale of Goods Act: in the Territories,
The Sale of Goods Ordinance.
94. Thus, the Code Napoleon's eight chapters in the title, Of Sale, have become
thirteen in the Civil Code; the Code Napoleon has no provision corresponding to the im-
portant art. 1488 of the Civil Code. The Canadian Comparative Table leaflet accompanying
G. Chalmers, Sale of Goods (13th ed. 1957) is a parallel section tabulation of the Sale of
Goods Act of the United Kingdom and all the provinces. The requirement of a writing,
earnest payment of receipt of goods for goods of substantial value (typically $40 or over)
derived from the original Statute of Frauds, survives in Canada.
95. "Our common law is rich in the exposition of principles, and these expositions
lose none of their value now that the law is codified." G. Chalmers supra note 94, at v.
96. The Sale of Goods Act § 18, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 358 § 18 (1960) [hereinafter cited
SGAI. Section references will follow Ontario numbering; equivalent but not necessarily
identically numbered sections in the acts of other provinces will be deemed to be referred
to.
97. SGA § 19, rule 1.
98. Id. § 19, rule 2.
99. Id. § 19, rule 5(i).
100. QCC art. 1025.
101. Id. art. 1026.
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when such quantification occasions the title passage.' 0 2 This contrasts with the
Act's provision that, in those circumstances, title is presumed to pass when
the act is done and the buyer notified.10 3
The Code does speak in terms of presumption in connection with a sale
"upon trial," presumed to be "on a suspensive condition" absent indications of
another intention;104 this resembles the Act's provisions for sale "on approval
or 'on sale or return' or other similar terms."'1 5 The results in this situation
are substantially identical. 10 6 The Act clearly contemplates, reversing the rule
of Grantham v. Hawley, 0 7 that there can be no present sale of future goods'08
but in disregard of its provisions, the doctrine of potential property has received
judicial recognition.1 9 Under the Code, such sales are recognized either as
attaching to the goods upon their inception or as a transfer of the venture,
depending on the circumstances.110
Upon title passage, changes occur in the parties' rights, inter se and as to
third persons. The usual position under a bilateral executory (synallagmatic)
contract is that breach by a party entitles the other to recover damages incident
to nonperformance."' For the buyer, damages or specific performance in the
alternative are authorized under the Code at his option, 12 but under the Act
in the court's discretion. 1 3 Once title has passed, the seller becomes entitled to
the price of the goods, not just damages.114 Under the Act, overages or defi-
ciencies in delivery as well as a delivery co-mingled with nonconforming goods
empower the buyer to reject or accept, paying in case of quantity deviations
at the contract rate for goods accepted; 1 5 by limiting its deviation provisions
to immovables,"x6 the Code fails to provide any clear rule for movables in
these situations."17 Risk of loss, injury or diminished value, and conversely the
benefit of accretions or enhanced value, prima facie shift from seller to buyer
upon title passage under the Act; 118 under the Code, the buyer is entitled to
102. Id. art. 1474.
103. SGA § 19, rule 3.
104. QCC art. 1475.
105. SGA § 19, rule 4.
106. See Pitrie v. Racey, 37 D.L.R.2d 495 (B.C. 1963); Ward v. Cormier, 39 N.B.
567, 8 E.L.R. 466 (1910); Laurin v. Ginn, 18 Que. K.B. 116, 5 E.L.R. 335 (1908).
107. Hob. 132, 80 Eng. Rep. 281 (C.P. 1616).
108. See SGA § 6(3).
109. See Jacobson v. Int'l Harvester Co., 11 Alta. 122c, 124, 10 W.W.R. 955 (1916).
110. See 7 J. Mignault, supra note 91, at 50-51.
111. SGA §§ 48(2), 49(2)("directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course
of events from the . . . breach"), 52; QCC art. 1074 ("which have been foreseen or might
have been foreseen").
112. QCC art. 1065.
113. SGA § 50.
114. Id. § 47(1); cf. QCC art. 1532.
115. Id. § 29.
116. See QCC arts. 1501, 1502.
117. The case law reaches similar results to that in common laiv jurisdictions; see M.
Faribault, Traite du Droit Civil 186 n.345 (1961).
118. SGA § 21.
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the profits following the sale but the seller remains obligated to deliver "the
thing . . . in the state in which it was at the time of the sale." 119
The Act provides a vendor with methods of recourse to the goods to
secure payment of the price independent of terms in the underlying contract
or in any contract of carriage. If no credit arrangement is in force, the unpaid
vendor has a possessory lien with the general attributes of that class of security
plus a qualified power of sale;' 2 0 under the Code there is a comparable dis-
pensation from the obligation of delivery.'2 1 Under the Act, furthermore, an
unpaid seller by appropriate notification, grounded upon the buyer's insolvency,
while the goods are in transit may obligate the carrier to hold the goods subject
to the seller's directions.12 2 The Code handles the matter differently. It does
not concern itself with the carrier's holding, probably because the irrelevance
of "appropriation" largely obviates the occasion for attaching special impor-
tance to it. Instead, the Code gives the seller the right of revendicating the
goods'2 8 or a privilege on their proceeds 24 for eight days after their delivery
to the buyer (thirty days if he is insolvent). The latter is often more valuable
but is not available in cases of sales on credit 125 where accordingly the common
law's remedy of stoppage in transitu is more favorable to sellers.
The two systems use radically different principles to reach similar results
so far as regards dealings with third persons. In the common law provinces
one without title can convey none.'26 Except that anciently St. Johns, New-
foundland, was market overt for fish,' 2 7 the doctrine of market overt is not and
never was in effect.' 2 8 But in Quebec, exceptions to the rule nemo dat quid non
habet are recognized "if (the sale) be a commercial matter or if the seller after-
wards become owner of the thing";1 2 9 and the owner of a lost or stolen article
"bought in good faith in a fair or market, or at a public sale, or from a trader
dealing in similar articles" can not reclaim without reimbursing the purchaser' 80
and, if sold "under the authority of law," not at all.'8 ' Outside Quebec, the
Quebec provision has been treated as not going to title.18 2
In the event of successive sales by a seller remaining in possession, the
bona fide purchaser first taking possession will prevail even against those to
whom title passed under an earlier dealing. 188 The Act assimilates this to acting
119. QCC art. 1498.
120. SGA §§ 39-41; Snagproof, Ltd. v. Brody, 18 Alta. 392, 69 D.L.R. 271, [1922]
3 W.,.R. 432.
121. QCC arts. 1496, 1497.
122. SGA §§ 42-44; see Richardson v. Twining, 8 N.S. 281 (1871).
123. QCC arts. 1998, 1999.
124. Id. art. 2000.
125. Id. art. 1999(1).
126. See SGA § 22.
127. Baine, Johnson & Co. v. Chambers, 1 Newf. S. Ct. 154 (1819).
128. See SGA § 23.
129. QCC art. 1488.
130. Id. art. 1489.
131. Id. art. 1490.
132. See McKenna v. Prieur, 56 Ont. L.R. 389, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 460 (1924).
133. SGA § 25(1); QCC art. 1027.
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under an authority from the owner, to which it also equates a like transfer by
a person having possession of goods which he has contracted to buy.134 Again
Quebec reaches a like, perhaps even broader, result by making "a promise of
sale with tradition and actual possession . . .equivalent to sale.' 135 The civil
law's general antipathy" 6 to the concept of estoppel, so laxly welcomed in the
common law, may account for their different paths to much the same position.
Defective goods or a defective title can not be palmed off on a buyer who
has bargained for something better. The Act, following the common law, treats
this as a matter of condition or of warranty. The difference is that a condition
permits the buyer either to reject the goods or to claim damages, while a war-
ranty limits him to the latter.1" 7 Passage of title to goods specific at the time
of the bargain and acceptance of goods in other cases normally reduces a con-
dition to a warranty."'8 A corollary is that the buyer is given an opportunity
to make reasonable examination of goods not previously examined and is not
taken as having accepted them before either lapse of a reasonable or stated
time or a manifestation of his assent to become their owner.1 39
For defects in title, there are implied warranties for quiet possession and
against encumbrances and an implied condition of right to sell140-the ensemble
resembling in substance, it will be noted, the obligations of a vendor of real
property. For defects of quality, the Act provides "there is no implied war-
ranty or condition . . . except" that conditions are implied of (a) reasonable
fitness for a particular purpose disclosed by the buyer in such a way as shows
he relies on the seller's skill or judgment to satisfy it, if the seller is one regu-
larly dealing in that class of goods but not if the goods are bought by "patent
or other trade name," and (b) merchantable quality as to goods bought by
description from a dealer in that class of goods, but not for observable defects
if the buyer has examined the goods.1 41 This formula of a negative general rule
with defined exceptions reflects the ancient maxim, caveat emptor, but legal
prescription has in Canada, as elsewhere, been yielding ground to changed
business operations and new social policies, particularly though not exclusively
in sales for consumption. So, a particular purpose need not be distinctive but
may involve only the normal or standard use of articles and disclosure of the
use can be implicit from the fact of their purchase.1 42 A very considerable
reliance by a buyer on his own judgment or that of a third person does not
prevent the condition if there has been to some appreciable degree a reliance
134. SGA § 25(2).
135. QCC art. 1478.
136. See Heeney, Estoppel in the Law of Quebec, 8 Can. B. Rev. 401, 500 (1930).
137. SGA § 12(1), (2); Home Gas Co. v. Streeter, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 842, 8 W.W.R.
(n.s.) 689 (Sask.).
138. SGA § 12(3).
139. Id. §§ 33, 34.
140. Id. § 13.
141. Id. § 15.
142. See, e.g., Van Doren v. Perlman, 38 Mar. Prov. 1 (Newf. 1956) (Fur coat must
be fit for wear.); Thompson v. Cameron, 41 N.S. 29, 2 E.L.R. 192 (1906) (cash register).
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upon the seller as well. 143 Where a seller is held liable for goods he never saw,
such goods having been sent out as premiums by his suppliers under contract,
the notions of the seller's possessing any skill or judgment whatever about them
or of his being a dealer in them have been attenuated virtually to extinction.'4
The requirement of privity of contract between seller and buyer still survives,145
even if a bit battered; 146 but acceptance of the doctrine of Donoghue v. Ste-
venson 147 and of easy ways of establishing the negligence element makes its
survival relatively unimportant. 148 Whatever its text may say, the Act has been
accommodated to a wide range of consumer claims of defects in goods.
Besides fitness and merchantability, in sales of appropriate type a con-
dition which is expressed, rather than implied, of correspondence to description,
sample, or both is enforced. 1 49 An odd departure from the doctrine as received
elsewhere is the suggested distinction between a sale by sample and a sale from
samples, with the former confined to the situation where the representative
specimen was actually drawn from the bulk.150
Conditions and warranties are quite independent of misrepresentations or
negligence. They may coexist, but the members of either pair are in no sense
ingredients in the other.' 5 '
The Code provisions about conditions'52 in obligations relate to future
happenings not present qualities; 153 but the goods must meet the quality terms
which were agreed to, otherwise the seller is in breach of his undertakings. 54
Hence, the substance, though not the formulation, of the buyer's rights is com-
parable to the situation under the Act. When the Code implies terms, its prime
reliance is on warranty-the warranty against eviction or the warranty against
latent defects. 5 5 The former is much like the title warranties for quiet posses-
sion and against encumbrances noted above. 56 The latter extends to latent de-
fects which "render it unfit for the use for which it was intended, or so diminish
its usefulness that the buyer would not have bought it, or would not have given
143. See, e.g., Preload Co. of Can., Ltd., v. City of Regina, [1959] Can. S.Ct. 801, 20
D.L.R.2d 586.
144. See Buckley v. Lever Bros., Ltd., [1953] Ont. 704, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 16.
145. See Varga v. John Labatt, Ltd., [1956] Ont. 1007, 6 D.L.R.2d 336.
146. See Yelland v. National Cafe, [1955] 5 D.L.R. 560, 16 W.W.R. (n.s.) 529 (Sask.)
(Where there was a purchase of soft drink from retailer for family consumption, recovery
was denied against bottler but allowed against retailer in action by consumer whose father
bought as her "agent.").
147. [1932] A.C. 562.
148. Cf. O'Fallon v. Inecto Rapid, Ltd. 53 B.C. 266, [1939] 1 D.L.R. 805 [1939] 1
W.W.R. 264 (1938); Varga v. John Labatt, Ltd., [1956] Ont. 1007, 6 D.L.R.2d 336.
149. SGA §§ 14, 16. But see Walker & Co. v. Wiselberg, 36 Que. K.B. 105 (1923)
(vente par echantillon).
150. East Asiatic Co. v. Can. Rice Mills, Ltd., 54 B.C. 204, [1939] 3 D.L.R. 695, [1939]
3 W.W.R. 180; see Matter of Faulkners, Ltd., 40 Ont. L.R. 75, 38 D.L.R. 84 (1917)(dictum).
151. See, e.g., Farmer v. Can. Packers, Ltd., [1956] Ont. 657, 6 D.L.R.2d 63.
152. QCC arts. 1079-1088.
153. M. Faribault, Trait du Droit Civil 18 (1959).
154. See Caplette v. Beaudoin, 41 Que. K.B. 398 (1926).
155. QCC arts. 1506, 1507.
156. Id. art. 1508.
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so large a price if he had known them.' 5 7 The seller is not held for patent
defects.'6 8 Merchantability is not critical.
For breach of warranty under the Code, the buyer acting with reasonable
diligence may either have a redhibitory action for the price upon restoring the
goods, or may keep them and get any difference in value attributable to the
latent defect, by way of damages.'6 9 The power of rejecting the goods does not
come to an end with their reception in the way the common law condition
turns into a warranty. The price is the upper limit to the buyer's recovery upon
redhibition (a) in case of the warranty against eviction if the buyer knew of
the title flaws at the time of the bargain, 160 and (b) in case of the warranty
against latent defects unless the seller knew or is legally presumed to have known
of them when he sold."'' Otherwise, the buyer may also have all resultant dam-
ages.' 6 2 Every producer or trader is legally presumed to know the properties of,
and thus any defects in, goods which he ordinarily makes or deals in, except
possibly when they are such that no available practicable test would reveal
them.1 6
3
The parties may contract for different, other, or no conditions or war-
ranties.1 64 The ingenuity of sellers in devising standard form clauses to negative
warranties or hobble their assertion has been often frustrated by the ingenuity
of judges in finding restrictive constructions. Thus, a provision that no condi-
tions or warranties not expressed have been given does not signify that the im-
plied ones are excluded;'6 5 a disclaimer of all conditions or warranties, statu-
tory or otherwise, does not rule out buyer relief grounded on misrepresentations,
the disclaimer terms forming no part of the relevant contract;' 16 and seller's
non-performance through essential non-correspondence of the goods furnished
with those contracted for continues as an available defense.'6 7 Provisions, not
quite so one-sided, limiting the period or the manner in which claims for defects
may be asserted, or specifying the extent of recovery, 08 such as repairs or, as
in the familiar "seedsman's warranty," 169 replacement cost, have been curtailed
less severely.
157. Id. art. 1522.
158. Id. art. 1523.
159. Id. arts. 1526, 1530.
160. Id. art. 1512.
161. Id. art. 1528.
162. Id. arts. 1511, 1527.
163. 7 J. Mignault, Droit Civil Canadien 112, 113 (1906).
164. SGA § 53; QCC art. 1507.
165. See, e.g., Canadian Fairbanks Morse Co. v. Teightmeyer, 16 Alta. 479, 60 D.L.R.
272, [1921J 2 W.W.R. 683; Ontario Wind Engine & Pump Co. v. Michie, 15 D.L.R. 359, 5
W.W.R. 948 (Man. 1913); R.W. Heron Paving, Ltd. v. Dilworth Equip., Ltd., (1963] 1 Ont.
201, 36 D.L.R.2d 462 (1962).
166. See Fillmore's Valley Nurseries, Ltd. v. North Am. Cyanamid, Ltd., 14 D.L.R.2d
297 (N.S. 1958); Manitoba Windmill & Pump Co. v. McLelland, 4 Sask. 500, 18 W.L.R. 680
(1911).
167. Alabastine Co. v. Can. Producer & Gas Engine Co., 30 Ont. L.R. 394, 17 D.L.R.
813 (1914).
168. See Spelchan v. Long, 2 D.L.R.2d 707 (B.C. 1950).
169. See Varga v. Stokes Seeds Ltd., [1962] Ont. 339, 32 D.L.R.2d 167.
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Sales which jeopardize the position of persons giving or continuing credit
hypothetically in reliance on the holding of goods as an indicium of the seller-
debtor's business standing are denied finality. By federal law, an insolvent
seller's transfer by way of preference is itself an act of bankruptcy1 70 and sub-
ject to be treated as void by the trustee if bankruptcy proceedings against the
seller commence within three months thereafter,171 the trustee being entitled to
recover the goods or their proceeds from the buyer.1 72 Outside bankruptcy, the
provinces provide for striking down fraudulent conveyances-those of the com-
mon law tradition by legislation modeled on the Statute of Elizabeth respecting
conveyances with intent to "hinder, delay or defraud" creditors,173 and Quebec
by authorizing the Paulian action174 which may be a shade narrower in appli-
cation. 175
One situation attracting special attention is that covered by the bulk sales
acts which address themselves to dealings in the aggregate assets of an enter-
prise. The basic arrangement is to call for the furnishing by the seller of a
schedule of creditors and to require compliance with prescribed procedures for
applying the buyer's payment to their claims or for getting their consent to the
sale. If these steps are not taken, the buyer exposes himself to a successful
challenge by creditors of the validity of the sale without inquiry into issues of
good faith, notice, or exchange of value. There are variations among the prov-
inces as to the kinds of business, kinds of sale, or kinds of creditor falling
within the scope of the Act, the form of the creditors' schedule and the respon-
sibility for taking the initiative in its provision, the techniques of purchase
price application to creditor claims, the proceedings available in case of non-
compliance, as well as other important particulars.176 The particular statute
and the decisions construing it must be consulted. The terms of some perhaps
impede the carrying out of quite legitimate business activities; but the broad
policy is firmly entrenched in the law.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Mass markets imply a credit economy and, moreover, an economy of secured
credits. When trade was either barter or a concourse of communally supervised
participants in fairs and markets, there was little occasion for mercantile law
170. The Bankruptcy Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 14, § 20(1)(c) (1952).
171. Id. § 64(2).
172. Id. § 66(2).
173. See, e.g., The Fraudulent Preferences Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 120 (1955); The
Assignments and Preferences Act, N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 17; (1954); The Fraudulent Con-
veyances Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 154 (1960).
174. QCC arts. 1032-1040.
175. For a comprehensive discussion of the Paulian action in Quebec law, see 7 G.
Trudel, Traite de Droit Civil de Quebec 435-534 (1946).
176. For statutory variations, see B.C. Rev. Stat., c. 39 (1960) ; N.S. Rev. Stat., c. 27(1954) ; Ont. Rev. Stat., c. 43 (1960) ; QCC arts. 1569a-1569e. Legal authors have virtually
neglected the field, a major exception being Catzman, Bulk Sales in Ontario, 3 Can. BJ.
(1960), whose counsel had a leading part in the revision of the Bulk Sales Law in that
province.
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to concern itself with documented collateral. The means afforded the innkeeper
for assuring payment by holding the wayfarer's steed or the noble lord for stak-
ing the family plate against the moneylender's advances-matters outside the
course of commerce-were good enough precedents for the odd case in which
traders looked beyond promises for credit backing. They still serve, but they
no longer suffice. They have been adapted; they have been supplemented; and
the adaptations and supplementations, now an intricate complex, are a major
aspect of business relations and hence, although no part of traditional mer-
cantile law, they are a central element in actual mercantile law.
Secured transactions still bear the mark of their origin in other contexts.
The forms of action rule only from their graves; the forms of transaction still
walk the earth. One must deal not with security but with particular kinds of
security different in name and in attributes at common law and at civil law-
a necessity which precludes the blended treatment so far used and explains the
separate examination which follows, first of the security devices of the common
law provinces, then of those of Quebec. The relevant law is almost entirely
provincial.
Old fashioned liens and pledges still play a part, albeit a relatively minor
part. While they-liens particularly-often have statutory standing, 77 they
retain substantially their common law content. Characteristic aspects of a lien
-retention of possession as the condition and measure of the lienholder's
power,11 8 inability to sell the goods,'1 9 hazards of being treated as converter
for small deviations, °80 confinement to the specific item which occasioned the
claim and dislike of a lien for general balances of accountl'8 -limit its useful-
ness to small short term debts. The pledge, shaped more by the contract than
by general legal prescriptions, 182 escapes many of these difficulties;' 8 3 but even
it is predicated on a transfer of possession from pledgor to pledgeel 8' and in-
177. In Ontario, e.g., besides such federal statutes as, The Bank Act, Can. Rev, Stat.
c. 12, § 76 (1952), and The Canada Shipping Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 29, §§ 675-679 (1952),
the following from Ont. Rev. Stat. (1960) may need to be consulted: The Grain Elevator
Storage Act, c. 167, § 4, and The Innkeepers Act, c. 189, §§ 2, 32 7, and The Landlord
and Tenant Act, c. 206, §§ 29-59, and The Mechanics' Lien Act, c. 233, 8 48, and The
Pounds Act, c. 299, and The Sale of Goods Act, c. 358, §§ 38-41, and The Solicitors' Act,
c. 378, § 35(6), and The Unclaimed Articles Act, c. 409, §§ 4, 6, and The Warehouseman's
Lien Act, c. 423, and The Woodmen's Lien for Wages Act, c. 436. This list, which is not
warranted as exhaustive, is concerned only with lien claims of private persons on chattels;
it excludes real property liens and those to secure taxes and public charges. The range is
comparable in the other provinces.
178. See Can. Steel & Wire Co. v. Ferguson, 25 Man. 320, 21 D.L.R. 771, 8 W.W.R.
416 (1915); Hackett v. Coghill, 2 Ont. R. 1077 (1903).
179. Prete v. Lauzon, 52 Ont. L.R. 334, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 1152.
180. Cf. Barbeau v. Piggott, 9 Ont. W.R. 234 (1907).
181. See Bank of Montreal v. Guaranty Silk Dyeing and Finishing Co., [19341 Ont.
625, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 394 (rejecting asserted trade custom of general lien).
182. Cf. Matter of Thompson, [1931] Ont. 714, [1931] 4 D.L.R. 573.
183. By statute in some provinces goods may be pledged only for stated relatively
short periods; see, e.g., The Mercantile Law Amendment Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 238, § 11
(1960) (twelve months for logs, lumber and the like, six months for goods generally).
184. A retention of possession of the debtor's goods in the hands of the creditor at
the time of the security arrangement is given equivalent effect as the foundation of a
pledge. Matter of Shapiro, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 253, [1949] Ont. W.N. 606.
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volves a fairly strict surveillance of the pledgee's conduct in realizing on the
security.1 8r1 These elements, particularly the transfer of possession, are incon-
veniences since the pledgee will normally be set up to do business as lender,
not as dealer or warehouseman, while the pledgor on the other hand will often
want to be processing the goods or using them as business equipment. A ware-
house receipt, representative of the goods, may indeed be issued to the pledgee
obligating the pledgor to hold them pursuant to its terms; 186 but the obligation
is personal and does not attach to the goods so as to prejudice one buying them
in ordinary course of trade. Inventory pledges might be accomplished through
the somewhat elaborate field warehousing arrangement, but that has never
caught on in a large way. A floating charge upon a class of assets whose members
are contemplated as fluctuating in the ordinary operations of the debtor's busi-
ness is possible; but it awaits some crystallizing event before it attaches to
anything,18T prior to which it exists in a state of suspended animation which
may result in its being postponed in security as it is in time.
The chattel mortgage has been valuable in appropriate circumstances. In
theory, it is a transfer of title in goods to the creditor subject to defeasance by
the buyer's exercising his equity of redemption, normally leaving possession
with the buyer so that they can be used for production of income. The buyer,
having no title after the transfer, could convey none were it not for the protection
accorded those dealing on the faith of the buyer's apparent ownership of goods
retained by him after sale. The obvious solution, provision for public registry as
a condition to setting up the chattel mortgage against third person's claims
based on the unchanged possession, was adopted early 88 and is now in general
use.
1 89
Nothing more is needed for a debtor to use his present holdings as a basis
for credit; and the law also recognizes the effectiveness of after-acquired prop-
erty clauses to bring later acquisitions within the coverage of the security' 90 and
of mortgagee's power of sale clauses to permit turnover,191 so that a shifting
185. See A.E. Ames & Co. v. Sutherland, 9 Ont. L.R. 631 (1905) appeal dismissed,
11 Ont. L.R. 417 (1906), aff'd, 37 Can. S. Ct. 694 (1906) (Sale by pledgee without giving
notice was held to be a breach of contract though not a termination of pledgee's special
property interest.).
186. See The Mercantile Law Amendment Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 238, § 9 (1960).
187. Gordon Mackay, Ltd. v. JA. Larocque, Ltd., [19273 Can. S. Ct. 374, [1927]
2 D.L.R. 1150; Meen v. Realty Dev., Ltd., [19543 1 D.L.R. 649, [1954] Ont. W.N. 193
(1953).
188. "An Act requiring Mortgages of Personal Property in Upper Canada to be
filed," [18493 Prov. Can. Stat. 12 Vict. c. 74 was the earliest Canadian legislation on the
subject.
189. In each common law province and territory there is a separate chapter on chat-
tel mortgages (and bills of sale) in the Revised Statutes, save in Newfoundland. There are
two sections of The Registration of Deeds Act, Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 14, §§ 27, 31 (1952),
which deal with the matter in a somewhat rudimentary way.
190. See Imperial Brewers, Ltd. v. Gelin, 18 Man. 283, 9 W.L.R. 99 (1908); Creighton
v. Jenkins, 17 N.S. 352 (1884).
191. Cf. Ashmore v. Trans-Canada Fin. Corp., 39 Man. 52, [1930] 4 D.L.R. 982,
[1930] 2 W.W.R. 558. Indeed authority to sell in the ordinary course of business, but not
otherwise, is implied as a term of the mortgage; see MacDonald v. Canadian Accept.
Corp., [1955] Ont. 73, [1955] 2 D.L.R. 360.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
stock of goods may be its subject. The chattel mortgage arrangement, a qualified
conveyance from debtor to creditor, is ill-suited, however, to the provision of
security for the price of goods being transferred from the creditor to the debtor.
That can indeed be handled by a purchase-money mortgage but only in a
convoluted manner, always awkward and by its additional steps creating addi-
tional risks.19 2 Hire purchase was one possible way of fusing the sales and secur-
ity aspects; but that line was not taken and the notion has been absorbed into
the alternative which was chosen, the conditional sale.'0 3 After initial judicial
fumbling with an unfamiliar transaction 9 4 which, falling outside the chattel
mortgage acts, resurrected the danger of secret claims, statutes were enacted
setting up an independent filing system for conditional sales agreements and
there are now probably more of such dealings than of any other form of security
agreement, perhaps more than all others combined.
This still leaves the case where the buyer, contemplating acquisition of
goods from one source and of the funds for their purchase from another, needs
to use the prospective goods as security for the prospective funds. The trust
receipt device is admirably adapted to this end, but, in prudent submission to
what was perhaps only dictum, although certainly very extensive dictum' 10 6
it has not been received into the commercial practice. The overriding federal
provisions of section 86 of the Bank Act, where complied with, may permit a
dealing in effect not very different from a trust receipt in the special case of a
bank credit;196 but, aside from that, there has been no legislation for registering
such contracts and no use of them.' 7
The law makes choses in action, as well as goods, property available as
security. The special situation of company financing secured by the terms of
bonds, debentures, and trust deeds is not here examined but should be noted.
Holders of shares or bonds of companies and holders of negotiable paper, wishing
their use as security for loans, may employ a transaction in the nature of a
pledge.'0 8 For documents of title-bills of lading and warehouse receipts-a
192. See, e.g., Reporter Publ., Ltd. v. Manton Bros., Ltd., 29 D.L.R.2d 54, 35 W.W.R.
(n.s.) 498 (Man. 1961).
193. See, e.g., Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54 (1955), (Conditional Sales Act applies to sale or
balhment but excluding by § 3, baliments do not have the attributes of a hire purchase.);
Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 61, § 2(2) (1960) (Substantive rules of previous subsection "appl[y]
to the case of a hire receipt where the hirer is given an option to purchase.") ; P.E.I, Rev.
Stat. c. 28, § 1 (1951) ("Conditional sale" includes contracts "for the hiring of goods.");
Yuk. Terr. Rev. Ord. c. 20, § 2(b) (1958) (same). Now and then a hire purchase form
is used but the assimilation of these infrequent dealings to conditional sales seems to be
complete. In Newfoundland the provisions for chattel mortgage registry are expressly made
inapplicable to hire purchase agreements and to conditional sales, Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 141,
§ 39 (1950), and there is no statute which addresses itself to such transactions.
194. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Pringle, 18 Ont. A.R. 218 (1891).
195. See Matter of Dominion Shipbldg. & Repair, Ltd., 53 Ont. L.R. 485 (Wkly. Ct.
1923).
196. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 12, § 86 (1952).
197. See Mandell, Trust Receipt Financing, 19 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev, 127 (1961).
198. For illustrations of this method of dealing, see A.E. Ames & Co. v. Sutherland,
9 Ont. L.R. 631 (1905), and Warren v. Bank of Montreal, 14 Ont. W.R. 622, 1 Ont. W.N.
28 (1909).
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closer equivalent is the chattel mortgage 9 9 with continuous possession in the
mortgagee. Besides these special types of choses in action, there is the undiffer-
entiated mass of customers' accounts and other business claims which forms
an appreciable part of the assets of many an enterprise. Written assignment of
these book debts, existing or future, by way of security is authorized; but again,
for the protection of third persons, only upon the condition of registration as
provided in the Act.200
Thus there are provisions in effect whereby a wide range of security trans-
actions is available, many with a common element of public registry as a safe-
guard. They cannot be said to constitute a system, however, because of the
dissimilarities in the requisites for and consequences of registration.
Registration of assignments of book debts and of chattel mortgages needs
an accompanying affidavit of good faith by assignee or mortgagee (and often an
assignor's or witness affidavit, too) of indicated content which is different for
the two forms of security; conditional sale needs none.20 1 Despite a provision
that clerical irregularities or errors which, variously, are not calculated to mis-
lead or deceive, or do not have the effect of misleading or deceiving or did not
actually mislead or deceive do not impair the registration,202 the courts have
inclined to insist on a rather rigorous conformity with the prescriptions of the
particular statute and to treat variances as destroying the effect of the registra-
tion 203-a treatment also given similar clauses about petty defects in conditional
sales filings.204 The prescribed place of registry is different for the different trans-
actions20 5 and it is not always easy to know where a searcher should look. Time
199. This follows from the rule that "The endorsement or transfer vests in the trans-
feree from the date thereof all the right or title of the transferor to or in the goods, subject
to the right of the transferor to have the goods, warehouse receipt or bill of lading re-
transferred to him if the debt is paid when due." Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 238, § 8(2) (1960).
The situation is similar elsewhere.
200. For representative Assignment of Book Debts Acts, see Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 18(1955); N.W. Terr. Rev. Ord. c. 5 (1956); N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 16 (1954).
201. Compare Assignment of Book Accounts Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 19, § 7 (1960)
(affidavit of witness), and Bills of Sale Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 28, § 14 (1960) (witness
affidavit of execution), and Bills of Sale Act, B.C. Rev. Stat., c. 28, § 19 (1960) (affidavit
of bona fides), with The Conditional Sales Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 70, § 3 (Prescriptions for
filing, but no affidavit is mentioned.); but compare Assignment of Book Debts Act, P.E.I.
Rev. Stat., c. 13, §§ 4(1), (6) (1951) (affidavits of bona fides by assignee, of execution
by witness), and Bills of Sale Act, P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 18, § 7 (1951) (affidavit of witness
or acknowledgment by grantor) and P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 18, § 8(2) (1950) (affidavit of
bona fides), with The Conditional Sales Act, P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 28, § 2(2) (1951) (filing
provision not referring to affidavit).
202. See, e.g., Assignment of Book Debts Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 356, § 19 (1953);
Bills of Sale Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 357, § 26 (1953).
203. See, e.g., Indus. Accept. Corp., Ltd. v. Whiting, 15 W.W.R. (n.s.) 690 (Alta.
1955); Adkins v. National Fin., [1950] 1 W.W.R. 1081 (Sask.).
204. See Traders Fin. Corp., Ltd. v. Nova Scotia Trust Co., 29 D.L.R.2d 345, 46
Mar. Prov. 235 (N.S. 1961).
205. Thus, in New Brunswick, the filing is to be generally with "the proper officer"
of a "registration district": as to chattel mortgages, that "in which the chattels . . . are
situated at the date of execution," N.B. Rev. Stat. c. 18, § 6(3) (1952), and as to con-
ditional sales, that "in which the buyer resided" or for non-residents "in which the goods
are delivered," id. c. 34, § 3(2), and as to book debts five alternative locales are listed vary-
ing with the assignee's incorporated status and its business activities, id. c. 12, § 4(1).
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gaps between transaction and registration are variously treated; for instance,
conditional sales may be filed up to ten days and assignments of book debts
registered up to thirty days after the transaction with retroactive effect, while
chattel mortgages must coincide in execution and registration unless, upon good
cause shown, a judge allows later registration, but even that does not relate
back.20 6 The registry's effectiveness may be indefinite in duration or for different
fixed periods with a possibility of renewal by timely advance refiling whose
details are particularized somewhat differently for the different types of deal-
ing.20 7 Something is done by way of spelling out the rights and duties conse-
quent upon a conditional seller's exercising his contract recourse against the
security,208 as also is true of some lien statutes200 but not of the typical chattel
mortgage or assignment of book debts act. The law on these and other items is
a jumble of particulars defying coherent statement. In this medley of prescrip-
tions, diversified according to the form of the transaction, bewildered creditors,
debtors, or third persons may almost account it a happy accident when multiple
registration provisions give better assurance than would none at all. Integration
of the law of personal property security transactions, in line with Article
Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, so as to eliminate divergence in results,
and to achieve effective province-wide registration without discarding use
between the parties of any desired type, has recently been attained in Ontario,
2 10
and is under consideration in several other provinces.
In some western provinces statutes exclude a creditor from enforcing per-
sonal contracts for the deficiency, at least after he has resorted to enforcement
of his chattel security.211 This debtor's relief legislation operates with respect
to successors in interest as well as between the original parties to the trans-
action212 but there is a loophole in that any arrangement not falling strictly
206. The text summarizes Ontario provisions, see Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 24, § 3(1) (c)
(1960) (assignment of book debts), and c. 34, §§ 4, 10 (chattel mortgages), and c. 61,
§ 2(1)(b) (conditional sales). The details vary from province to province but non-uni-
formity as among transactions is a common feature.
207. E.g., in Prince Edward Island, registry of assignments of book debts is to be
renewed triennially, see P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 13, § 7 (1951), and of chattel mortgages quin-
quennially, see id. c. 18, § 11. However, no limitation of time is specified in connection
with conditional sales filings.
208. Thus, to claim for a deficiency on resale, the respossessing conditional seller must
give notice strictly according to statute; see Garner v. Garner, 6 D.L.R.2d 87, 19 W.W.R.
(n.s.) 595 (B.C. 1956); Myers Motors, Ltd. v. Patafie, 18 D.L.R.2d 679,[ 1959] Ont. W.N.
82. Buyers' rights on default are not spelled out but there has been some judicial effort to
supply them by implication from the qualifications on the seller's rights being read as
duties; cf. Duthie v. Lounsbury, Ltd., 4 D.L.R.2d 631 (N.B. 1956), aff'd, [1957] Can. S.
Ct. 590, 9 D.L.R.2d 225.
209. See, e.g., The Canada Grain Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 25, § 83(3) (1952); The
Mechanics' Lien Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 233, § 48 (1960).
210. [19673 Ont. Stat. c. 73. The substantive provisions of the Act are not yet oper-
ative, but will come into effect on a date to be proclaimed, id. § 72, to allow for establish-
ment of the registration machinery. A serious gap in the Act is the exclusion of corporate
secured charges. See id. § 3(1).
211. Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 54, § 19 (1955); cf. Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 95, § 18 (1953)
(Existence of "lien" destroys contract right to price.).
212. See, e.g., Matter of McDonnell Holdings Co., 39 W.W.R. 471 (Alta. 1962).
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within the forms of security specified leaves the creditor free to have both
chattel and action.213
Under the Civil Code in Quebec, the approach is the same-provision for
a variety of particular security devices, each with its own attributes. The
designations naturally differ from, and no one of them is exactly like, any one
of those developed under the common law, though in total coverage they are
not radically different.
The pledge ("pawn") of a movable combines features of common law lien
and pledge. Like the former it is, with qualifications soon to be noticed, a power
of holding possession to enforce payment, without any power of sale or dis-
position.214 Like the latter, it stems not from services of some kind specially
affecting the goods, but from an ad hoc contract,215 and even goes beyond it in
permitting the creditor to retain for after-contracted debts due and owing as well
as for that on account of which the article was pledged.216 Farmers and traders
may, additionally, pledge their business equipment for not over a ten-year
credit 217 (and for farmers' inventory as well) ,218 while retaining possession as
quasi-borrowers from the creditor, but only by a notarial deed which must be
deposited in the proper registry office.2 19 This being done, the creditor may on
default demand possession or sell publicly.220 He may not stipulate for a relin-
quishment to him of title relieved of any duty to sell.221
Privilege, a broader category than pledge, is more a scheme of priorities222
than a counterpart of any common law type of security. It embraces, inter alia,
pledgees2 23 as a class plus unpaid vendors224 and an array, reminiscent of tradi-
tional common law liens, of persons performing services related to the goods.22 5
All are given preference over general creditors and rank in the order of their
respective preferences; 22 6 the unpaid vendor also has, as has been mentioned
already, a right of revendication. 227
The concept of divided title, legal and equitable, established by Chancery,
is alien to the civil law system where there are no mortgages and no chattel
mortgages. The nearest equivalent is the contract of sale with right of redemp-
tion reserved.22 8 It, like the chattel mortgage, contemplates a conveyance subject
213. Cf. Crook v. Yewchuk, [19621 Can. S. Ct. 535.
214. QCC arts. 1970; 1971.
215. Id. art. 1967.
216. Id. art. 1975.
217. Id. arts. 1979a, 1979e.
218. Id. art. 1979a.
219. Id. arts. 1979b, 1979f, 1979g.
220. Id. arts. 1979c, 1979i.
221. Id. arts. 1979d, 1979k.
222. Id. art. 1983 ("a right which a creditor has of being preferred to other credi-
tors according to the origin of his claim").
223. Id. art. 1994(4).
224. Id. art. 1994(3).
225. See id. art. 2001.
226. See L. Baudoin, Le Droit Civil de la Province de Quebec 905, 906 (1953).
227. QCC art. 1998.
228. See Faribault, Remere et Clause Resolutoire, 1 Rev. de Bar. 121 (1941).
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to the resolutory condition of restoration upon repayment. 20 The permissible
provisions of such a contract and the way rights under it are to be asserted-
including a term against "strict foreclosure"-are set out in detail in the Civil
Code.230 A structural disadvantage is that it normally supposes possession held
by the buyer for the redemption term, guarding against prejudice to the seller
by disallowing after redemption incumbrances placed on the moveables by the
buyer during the holding, but not really adapted to allowing active use by the
seller, as would often be commercially desirable instead of a sterile holding by
the buyer. No public registry system is established as an alternative to a change
of possession, at least for movables. 231 The omission is more striking in
view of the provision for registry of "the sale of the whole, of a portion or of
a particular category of debt or book accounts, present or future, of a person,
firm or corporation carrying on a commercial business" 232 although even this
is only an optional step in making such a transfer effective, being in effect a
substitute for notifying the debtor owing the assigned claim as a basis for
asserting "possession available against third persons. " 233 The conjoint step of
newspaper publication provides the element of publicity. Book debts thus have
a closer analogue than do chattel mortgages but not very close.
Hire purchase agreements are made sales; 23 4 and sales with a title reten-
tion clause are made simple credit term contracts "transfer [ing] to the buyer
the property of the thing sold" 235 unless they meet the very precisely stated
requirements as to terms, form, and subject matter (e.g., "commercial sales
only at retail and not exceeding . . . eight hundred dollars") for statutory
qualification as sales on the installment plan.236 If they do, a transferrable right
quite comparable to a conditional seller's exists. As under the legislation of the
western provinces, upon the buyer's default there is an "option either [to]
exact payment of the instalments due or retake possession of the thing,... [i] n
[which] latter case the buyer is freed ... of the balance of the price of sale and
of the payment of the notes. . . . 27 Here again there is no provision for the
registry of contracts with title retention terms, whether qualifying as sales on
the installment plan or not.
As against the confusing multiplicity of registry provisions for different
types of transactions encountered in the common law provinces, virtual absence
of any as a condition for establishing claims to security based on moveables
effective against third persons characterizes the Civil Code. In any given case,
that can clearly mean a difference in the relative positions of persons seeking
to subject such property to their claims. The overall effect is not clear. Bona
229. See QCC art. 1546.
230. Id. arts. 1547-1550.
231. For inmoveables, there is such a provision, see id. art. 2102.
232. Id. art. 1571d.
233. See id. art. 1571.
234. Id. art. 1561i, par. 2.
235. Id. art. 1561i, par. 1.
236. Id. art. 1561j.
237. Id. art. 1561f.
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fide purchasers from the debtor in possession are better off in Quebec. This is
less true of bona fide creditors since the Civil Code provisions concerning pledges
and privileges may often effectively give more protection than registration with
all its uncertainties in the common law provinces.
One kind of security, that arising by contracts of suretyship and guaranty,
is essentially the same everywhere. It consists of the promise of another making
himself secondarily liable for a debt, i.e., liable in the event it is not met by the
person primarily undertaking its payment.238 Although the systems differ, in
such particulars as the requirement under the Statutes of Frauds provisions
generally in force in the common law provinces that the promise be in writing239
versus the Civil Code requirement that it be "expressed," 240 they are the same
in their general character including such major attributes as the rights to subro-
gation,241 contribution,242 and indemnity2 43 and even in such secondary ones as
that generally a surety is discharged by a release but not by a covenant not to
sue 2 44 or that the purely personal defenses of the primary debtor are not avail-
able to the surety.2 45 It may bear repeating that the primary or secondary status
of parties in this context is distinct from their position as primary or secondary
parties on negotiable paper, the former being ruled by provincial, the latter by
federal law.2 40
CARRIAGE OF GOODS
The constitutional and statutory framework within which the transporta-
tion industry operates, one of division between federal and provincial compe-
tence and, within both, one of a predominantly administrative oversight
grounded on special delegations for water, air, rail and motor carriage, prevents
the existence of a single body of rules governing the carriage of goods. But with
common law principles as a base and frame of reference, there is a standard
pattern whose outlines can be broadly traced even though the many and various
particulars cannot here be fully developed.
The British North America Act grants to Parliament of authority over
"Navigation and Shipping," extraprovincial ferries, "Lines of Steam or other
238. Bank of British North Am. v. Cuvillier, 14 Moo. P.C. 187, 15 Eng. Rep. 275
(1861); cf. Western Dominion Inv. Co. v. Macmillan, [19251 2 D.L.R. 442, [1925] 1
W.W.R. 852 (Man.); see also QCC art. 1929.
239. See, e.g., B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 369, § 5 (1960); N.S. Rev. Stat. c. 272, § 6(b) (1954).
240. QCC art. 1935.
241. See Matter of Pathe Freres Phonograph Co., 50 Ont. L.R. 644, 64 D.L.R. 628
(1921) ; see also QCC art. 1950.
242. See Patterson v. Campbell, 44 N.S. 214, 8 E.L.R. 49 (1910); Fast v. Zarchekoff,
20 Sask. 596, [1926] 4 D.L.R. 355, [1926] 2 W.W.R. 577; QCC art. 1955.
243. See Ramsdell v. Elliott, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 269, [1937] 1 W.W.R. 37 (Alta.); see
also QCC art. 1948.
244. S~e Guggisberg v. Weber, 18 Sask. 6, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 335, [1924] 1 W.W.R.
137 (release); Hall v. Thompson, 9 U.C.C.P. 257 (1860) (covenant not to sue); cf. QCC
art. 1185.
245. Cf. Pearson v. Calder, 35 Ont. L.R. 524, 27 D.L.R. 478 (1916) (infancy); Kim-
ball Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 27 D.L.R. 555 (Sask. 1916) (advance pending incorporation);
CC., art. 1958.
246. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Ships ... connecting the Province with any other... or extending beyond the
Limits of the Province" and the "Lines of Steam Ships between the Province
and any British or Foreign Country" effectively vest the federal government
with control of all commercially significant water carriage. As to air carriage,
"in its pith and substance .. . the whole field of aerial transportation comes
under the jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament, '247 a proposition which in
conjunction with the operation of the occupied field doctrine leaves small scope
for provincial activity. The tiny remainder of purely local water and air carriage
is of little commercial interest and has attracted only casual provincial regula-
tion.248 To all intents and purposes the law about carriage other than by land
is federal law.
While certain domestic shipping is subject to carrier licensing and corre-
sponding contract approval by the Board of Transport Commissioners,249 water
carriage is primarily a matter between shipper and carrier within the limits
fixed by general rules of law and more particularly by the Water Carriage of
Goods Act.250 The Canada Shipping Act2 5' is a comprehensive code of the
familiar type exemplified by the Merchant Shipping Acts. 2J2 In the Canada
Shipping Act, section 657 (limitation of liability), sections 664 and 665
(carrier's obligation to receive for carriage and carrier's liability) and sections
674-682 (delivery of goods and lien for freight) are especially relevant in the
present context.
The Aeronautics Act,2 53 a much less elaborate statute, in substance dele-
gates to the Air Transport Board, which it establishes, responsibility for govern-
ing air carriage by licensing, by orders or by regulations, including specifically
regulations "respecting traffic, tolls or tariffs," as the situation may make appro-
priate. The regulatory grant has been exercised mainly in connection with air
safety and air navigation; but the Commercial Air Services Regulation2 5 4 pro-
247. See Johannesson v. West St. Paul, [1952] 1 Can. S. Ct. 292, 303 (1951) (Rinfret,
CJ.).
248. Before the development of the present transportation network, private acts were
availed of to provide essentially local facilities; see, e.g., An Act to Incorporate the Upper
Columbia Navigation and Tramway Co., [1891) B.C. Stat. c. 50, repealed by [1926-271
B.C. Stat. c. 55 (1927); and An Act to Incorporate the Bear River Steamship Co., Ltd.
[1905] N.S. Stat. c. 141. For the floating of lumber, see, e.g., N.B. Rev. Stat. c. 219 (1952),
and ferries, see, e.g., Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 141 (1960), have attracted legislative attention. But
the lacuna as to intraprovincial water carriage generally is underscored by the specification
of regulatory authority so as not to embrace it, see, e.g., The Municipal and Public Utility
Board Act, Man. Rev. Stat. c. 175, § 2(i) (1954) ("Public utility" subject to Board control
is limited to railways and motor buses.). Perhaps this results because there is in fact no
significant relevant carriage to be dealt with. Similarly, air taxi service has been ignored
by the provinces even though it does not conveniently fit any of the service catgories of
the Commercial Air Services Regulation; [19491 S.O.R. 4, 5, and [1947] P.C. 972, at § 1.
249. See Can. Rev. Stat. c. 271, §§ 10-12 (1952) (Licensing applicable only to pro-
claimed places and not to be extended to intercoastal and many other branches of traffic.),
and id. § 31 (Tolls control for bulk water carriage of goods is limited to Mackenzie River.).
250. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 291 (1952).
251. Id. c. 29.
252. Cf. Cameron, The Canada Shipping Act, 7 Can. B. Rev. 111 (1929).
253. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 2 (1952).
254. [1949] S.O.R. 4, 5, and [1947] P.C. 972.
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vides an inclusive though sketchy technique of regulation requiring submission
to the Board by the air carriers of the terms and conditions of their contracts
of carriage, for scrutiny and potential revision. Any restraint in fashioning
contract terms favoring the carrier has been, as it is whenever proposal of
terms is left to a potential contracting party with the superior bargaining posi-
tion, a restraint mostly dictated by the pattern of the industry only somewhat
tempered by publication and the possibility of disallowance. For international
carriage firmer outlines are provided through Canadian adherence to the War-
saw Convention.2 55
The provision of railway service has been a central concern in Canadian
history, especially in the history of Confederation. This is reflected in the
British North America Act's grant to Parliament of authority over "Railways
... connecting the Province with any other... of the Provinces, or extending
beyond the Limits of the Province" and further over "Works ... situate wholly
within the Province ...declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the
general advantage of Canada . . . "156 in its imposition of a federal duty to
provide for an Intercolonial Railway in the Maritime Provinces, 257 in the clause
in the Order in Council admitting British Columbia which stipulated for a
railroad connection with that province,258 and in the railway clauses of the
schedule to the act for confirming the term of Newfoundland's union.2 59 As
early as 1868 Parliament enacted a Railway Act260 which, as modified over the
years, remains the organic law for rail carriers. 261 The mandate for its imple-
mentation was originally confided to the Railway Committee of the Privy
Council, now transmuted into the Board of Transport Commissioners. Like the
Air Transport Board, it has among its powers the general supervision of the
terms and conditions of contracts of carriage, including tolls and tariffs.
262
But, in contrast with the Aeronautics Act, the Railway Act itself prescribes a
wide array of particulars to which rate structures and railway practices, e.g.,
non-discrimination, 263 must conform. Moreover, it assigns a less passive role to
the Board than that given the Air Transport Board by the Aeronautics Act.
Instead of mere monitoring and disallowance, the Board of Transport Commis-
sioners is itself to formulate rules on various important subjects; for instance,
freight classification2 64 and limitation of liability provisions2 65 may originate
with it as well as with the railway. Even where the provisions originate with the
railway, the Board's function is not merely one of giving clearance; a provision
255. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 45 (1952).
256. BNA §§ 91(29), 92(10).
257. Id. § 145.
258. 6 Can. Rev. Stat. at 139, c. 11 (1952).
259. 12-13 Geo. VI c. 22, sched. §§ 3(a), 32, 33(a) (1948).
260. [1868] Can. Stat. c. 68.
261. It now appears as Can. Rev. Stat. c. 234 (1952).
262. See id. §§ 326, 353.
263. See id. §§ 319(3); 328(5).
264. See id. § 325.
265. See id. § 353(2).
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is not operative "unless ... first authorized or approved by order or regulation
of the Board,1266 a measure of participation calculated to implicate the Board
somewhat more in the final product.
Federal law dominates most substantial railway freight shipments having
extraprovincial incidents. However, a larger segment of railway freight traffic
is local to the province than is the case with air or water carriage and there is a
correspondingly increased range of operation for provincial legislation. Ac-
cordingly, Railway Acts exist in some of the larger provinces, similar to the
Federal Act and to each other in delegating control to some administrative
authority, but so dissimilar in the authority designated and in the content of
the delegation as to defy orderly brief summary.267 They cannot be left out of
account however in presenting a total picture of the law on carriage of goods.
Motor vehicle businesses are a prime domain of provincial law. There is a
great deal of commercial freight carriage by highway which is interprovincial and
hence open to federal regulation. However, Parliament has elected to leave the
matter to the provinces by a statute consolidating extraprovincial with local
operations in respect of the licensing and regulatory capacity of the provincial
boards.268 The quite general pattern in the provinces has been to use the licenses
required as a condition for commercial motor carrier operations as the instru-
ment for Board control.2 69 Licenses are obtainable and tenable only on condition
of compliance with, inter alia, regulations emanating from the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor in Council or from the Board with the assent of the Lieutenant Governor
in Council, whose authority to make regulations covers a wide range of matters,
commonly including that of "prescribing the forms of or conditions in the bill of
lading." 27o
Meticulous attention must obviously be paid to the kind and place of
carriage before one can determine what claims are recognized between shipper,
consignee, or carrier, and indeed before one can even know where to seek their
definition. Nevertheless, the traditional conceptions of the general law govern-
ing their relations have molded the exercises of regulatory powers by the con-
stituted authorities and filled in the interstices, so that some loose indication of
prevailing doctrine is possible.
The ancient common law distinction between a common carrier, holding
out a transportation service to the public, and a contract carrier, dealing by
special agreement, endures. 271 One licensed as a common carrier may contract in
the latter capacity for carriage beyond the ambit of the normal and licensed
266. See id. § 353(1).
267. See, e.g., B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 329 (1960); Que. Rev. Stat. c. 291 (1941).
268. [1953-54J Can. Stat. c. 59 (1954). The purpose and effect of the Act was to
circumvent the judgment in Winner v. SMT Eastern, Ltd., (1951] Can. S. Ct. 887, [1951)
4 D.L.R. 529.
269. See, e.g., P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. 134 (1951); Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 344 (1953).
270. See, e.g., Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 319, § 16(n) (1960).
271. See Permanizing, Ltd. v. Western Expressways, Ltd., 28 D.L.R.2d 32 (Sask. 1961).
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transportation service 272 Under the civil law, "carrier" seems to contemplate
more particularly the former 273 although at least for some purposes differential
consequences in line with common law results are recognized. 274
A common carrier may not refuse to receive appropriate goods in suitable
condition for carriage on the standard terms.275 There is no such obligation on
a contract carrier.276 The Civil Code is equivocal, clearly imposing on "carriers"
an obligation to receive and convey "all persons applying... if the transporta-
tion of passengers be a part of their accustomed business" as against one of
receiving "all goods offered for transportation" but qualifying the whole by
the proviso that "unless, in either case, there be a reasonable and sufficient cause
of refusal, '277 language arguably apt for setting up the existence of a course of
dealing by special contract.278
The significance of the distinction arises in connection with the carrier's
liability for losses arising in the handling of the goods more often than it does in
refusals to deal. Here it would seem that Quebec law, imposing liability on
carriers for loss or damage not shown to have arisen from "a fortuitous event
or irresistible force, or ... a defect in the thing itself" 279 accords with the com-
mon law,28 0 which provides an equivalent liability for the common carrier in
every case of loss or damage not attributable to an act of God or of the Queen's
enemies, 28 ' but holding a contract carrier only to exercise the care required of
any bailee for hire.28 2 These are the principles applicable in the absence of
express provisions otherwise in the contract of shipment,28 3 but such express pro-
visions are currently so common in practice that they almost devour the general
rule.
Carriage of goods generally and especially that by common carriers is, and
by statute or regulation often is required to be, subject to a writing emanating
from the carrier acknowledging the receipt of particular goods and undertaking
to carry and deliver them pursuant to the terms therein. Such a writing, usually,
although not invariably, styled a bill of lading, must follow a form prescribed
by or comply in its contents with the prescriptions of statute or regulation.
272. Consol. Plate Glass (Western), Ltd. v. Manitoba Cartage & Storage, Ltd., 20
D.L.R.2d 779 (Man. 1959), but cf. Pelletier v. Imperial Oil, Ltd., [19411 4 D.L.R. 732,
[19411 3 W.W.R. 739 (Sask.).
273. C. QCC art. 1673.
274. See 12 M. Faribault, Traite de Droit Civil 374 (1951).
275. Graham & Strong v. Dominion Express Co., 48 Ont. L.R. 83, 55 D.L.R. 39 (1920).
276. Cf. Permanizing, Ltd. v. Western Expressways, Ltd., 28 D.L.R.2d 32 (Sask. 1961).
277. QCC art. 1673.
278. Cf. Roussel v. Aumais, 18 Que. C.S. 474 (1900).
279. QCC art. 1675.
280. CNR v. Harris, [1946] Can. S. Ct. 352, [1946] 2 D.L.R. 545.
281. See Nystedt v. Wings, Ltd., 51 Man. 63, [1942] 3 D.L.R. 336; Ham v. McPherson,
6 0.S. 360 (U.C. 1842).
282. Tri-City Drilling Co. v. Velie, 22 D.L.R.2d 341, 30 W.W.R. (ns.) 61 (Alta. 1959).
283. How far these may go is well illustrated in W.R. Johnson & Co. et al. v. Inter-
City Forwarders, Ltd. et al., [1946] Ont. 754, [1946] Ont. W.N. 798, [1947) 1 D.L.R. 8
(applying a clause limiting amount of shipper's recovery to a case of theft of goods by
carrier's agent).
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One established feature of the applicable statutes or regulations is a
specification of the limitations of and conditions on liability of the carrier which
the bill of lading may contain.2 8 4 If a term is a permissible one, all that remains
is its interpretation to determine whether it applies to the circumstances estab-
lished as to the loss or damage; but that can be difficult enough, as an ex-
amination of the cases which have considered the "owner's risk" clause in the
federally approved bill of lading will confirm. 28 5 Under the Civil Code, a carrier
limitation of liability is in any event binding only upon persons to whom it is
made known and not even upon them if the damage is traced to the carrier's
fault 2 8K-a provision which if taken to be one of public order may not be
confined in operation to Quebec bills of lading or Quebec licensed carriers.287
Water carriage has attracted its own elaborate body of statutory rules for
carrier liability.28S
When the carriage shifts from one under a bill of lading to carriage dehors
the bill's terms, the exculpatory provisions vanish with the contract, to make
the liability rest on the carrier's status, e.g., as common carrier, 289 just as it
does when there is failure to supply a bill or use of a bill with unapproved ex-
culpatory provisions. In like manner, before the bailment becomes,2 0 or after it
ceases to be,2 91 one for carriage, the relevant standard is that of bailee for hire
with the resultant remission to the exercise of care as the criterion of liability.
The bill of lading's exculpatory terms are only incidental. Its primary func-
tion is to express the obligation to carry and deliver. The contract, although
made between shipper and carrier, is for carriage and delivery to the consignee
if a straight bill292 or to him or a holder under endorsement if an order bill;20 3
the consignee (or an assignee to the extent that the law allows assertion of
assigned contract rights) or the endorsee, even though thus not a contracting
party, has a direct right to the stipulated delivery or damages for breach of the
agreement to deliver.294 To the bill's quality of an acknowledgment of receipt
and a contract for delivery, there is added, if it is an order bill, that of being a
symbol of the goods and an indicium of a right to deal with them by a holder
284. See, e.g., [1955] Alta. O.C. 1003, reg. 3.8.3 (a); [1960) R.R.O. reg. 503, §§ 14, 15.
285. Compare CNR v. Harris, [19461 Can. S. Ct. 352, [19461 2 D.L.R. 545, with
Bodnoff v. CPR, [1946) Can. S. Ct. 392, [19461 2 D.L.R. 609.
286. QCC art. 1676.
287. See 7 J. Mignault, Droit Civil Canadien 387-390 (1906) for an analysis of the
provision as one of public order.
288. See The Water Carriage of Goods Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 291 (1952).
289. Pleet v. Canadian Northern Que. R.R., 50 Ont. L.R. 223, 64 D.L.R. 316 (1921).
290. Bell v. Windsor & Annapolis Ry., 24 N.S. 521 (1892); Swale v. CPR, 29 Ont.
L.R. 634, 15 D.L.R. 816 (1913); Beausejour v. Dominion Express Co., 5 Rev. de Jur. 503(1899).
291. See Milloy v. Grand Trunk Ry., 21 Ont. A.R. 404 (1894).
292. Cf. Matter of Eutenier, 9 W.L.R. 627 (Sask. 1908).
293. Cf. Vipond v. Sisco, 29 Ont. L.R. 200, 14 D.L.R. 129 (1913); Prairie City Oil
Co. v. Munn. 51 Que. C.S. 322, 32 D.L.R. 141 (1916). For the effect of a special endorse-
ment, see Graham v. Laird Co., 20 Ont. L.R. 11 (1909).
294. See The Bills of Lading Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 16, § 2 (1952); The Mercantile
Law Amendment Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 238, § 7(1) (1960).
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under requisite endorsements.295 Hence, where consignment is under an order
bill, the carrier can safely surrender the goods only upon production of the
bill, and claims in the goods are dependent on the rights consequent on taking
and holding an outstanding bill.2 96
"The carrier has a right to retain the things transported until . . . paid for
the carriage or the freight,"2 97 alike under the Civil Code and a common law
lien.2 98 The former ranks carriers first among all creditors having a right of
pledge or of retention.299 The common law lien, while not a general lien in the
sense that the carrier may hold goods for an unpaid balance of accounts, looks
to the bill of lading as a unit and permits the holding of such portion of the
goods as remain undelivered for freight charges arising under the entire bill
of lading under which they were carried rather than just their particular fraction
of these charges.o °
295. Bedard v. Spencer Grain Co., [19191 2 W.W.R. 723 (Man.).
296. See Corby v. Williams, 7 Can. S. Ct. 470 (1881).
297. QCC art. 1679.
298. Buffalo & Lake Huron R.R. v. Gordon, 16 U.C.Q.B. 283 (1858). The common law
lien is limited strictly to the amount due for carriage and does not extend to expenses in-
curred in maintaining possession incident to the assertion of the lien; see Winchester v.
Busby, 16 Can. S. Ct. 336 (1889).
299. See QCC art. 2001.
300. Neill v. Reid, 9 N.B. 246 (1859); De Senneville v. Baillargeon, 37 Que. C.S. 215
(1909).

